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1. Introduction and overview 
 
According to research by the World Bank (2011) there is a clear positive correlation between 
gender equality and GDP per capita, the level of competitiveness and human development. This 
is particularly true in the Middle East and Africa where female firm ownership and management 
is markedly low and female firm owners still face a variety of gender-specific obstacles.3 
While firm performance is affected by many factors, including the legal environment, 
corruption, political stability, and infrastructure, there is also evidence that ownership and 
manager characteristics have major effects on individual firm performance. While this has been 
well explored for firms in developed economies this is not the case for firms in developing 
economies.4  
In particular, the role of female ownership in firm performance in the Middle East and Africa 
remains to be investigated in detail. Empirical evidence so far suggests women managers may 
increase individual firm performance (Dezső and Ross, 2012; Smith et al., 2006). On the other 
hand, female firm owners face a variety of obstacles such as lack of access to financing. While 
access to financing is a critical issue for many African and Middle Eastern firms5, this is 
particularly the case for female-owned firms.6 
Largely due to lack of data availability existing literature on Middle eastern and African firms 
has presented anecdotal and survey-based evidence on firm performance and financing 
structures while detailed financial evidence (from balance sheets and profit/loss statements) is 
still lacking. 
This paper aims at filling this research gap. We identify the ownership type of firms and 
examine the impact of ownership structure on financing structure and firm performance. 
Financing structure is measured by available equity finance and the ratio of debt to equity. Firm 
performance is represented by sales, profits, and returns. Other firm characteristics include a 
measure of risk (volatility of profits) and firms are distinguished by country and industry. 
Ownership types are derived from the identity of the global ultimate owner and includes the 
gender of individual owners. Ownership information includes, besides gender, several other 
attributes of the ultimate global firm owner such as state or private ownership, family 
ownership, number of owners, ownership concentration, form of consolidation, and degree of 
independence. 
We use cross-sectional financial reporting data of 25,500 companies in the Middle East and 
Africa for the years 2006 to 2014. Data source is Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. 
Our data reveal a clear gender-specific pattern. The share of female-owned firms in the Middle 
East and Africa is approximately four percent on average. This share varies widely between 
countries but much less across industries. Female-owned firms have on average lower sales, 
profits and returns on equity. They also have lower levels of equity and debt capital and a lower 
leverage (gearing); i.e., ratios of debt to equity. 
Our results also reveal a clear gender-specific pattern. Increased availability of equity and/or 
debt capital as well as higher leverage have significantly positive effects on firm performance, 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Ahl (2006), Baliamoune-Lutz (2016), Baliamoune-Lutz (2015), Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2009), 
Hallward-Driemeier (2013), Minniti (2010). 
4
 See Baliamoune-Lutz (2011), Brixovia (2010), Painter and Dobie (2010), Rogerson (2000), Rugraff and Hansen (2008), Tarek 
and Mohamed (2008). 
5
 See, for example, Quartey (2003), Rocha et al. (2011). 
6
 Asiedu et al. (2013). 
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measured by sales, profits and returns on equity. Female ownership per se appears to 
significantly lower firm performance according to all measures used even when we control for 
the levels of available capital and the degrees of leverage. However, when the interaction of 
ownership with capital availability is taken into account, the effects change significantly. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 presents the general modeling 
and summarizes the results. Section 5 suggests a theoretical explanation. Section 6 concludes. 
Statistical and econometric results are presented in the appendix. 
 
2. Review of relevant literature 
 
Evidence from both theoretical and empirical literature suggests that factors related to firm 
characteristics (such as age and size of the firm, and industry type) and owner/manager 
attributes (such as age and education, gender, and social connections and membership in 
networks) can determine the ability to access credit/finance (Majed, 2010; Sorooshian, 2010). 
These factors, in general, tend to favor male over female-owned firms, although the evidence 
remains somewhat mixed. Studies have documented that there is a female-male gap at market 
entry and women-owned firms tend to be smaller in size, younger and disproportionately 
operating in low-profitability and low-growth sectors or industries, and that 
undercapitalization is a major contributor to this outcome (Kelly et al,. 2013; World Bank, 
2011; National [US] Women’s Business Council, 2015). 
In the following review of relevant studies, we summarize findings reported primarily in the 
empirical literature and related to our main focus in the empirical section of the paper: access 
to finance and gender, as determinant of firm performance. The main hypothesis being that  
because relative to their male counterparts, women firm owners/managers are generally 
younger, less educated, with younger and smaller firms and are in sectors that are traditionally 
less attractive to men (lower-risk and lower-profitability businesses), they have lower access 
to finance. 
 
2.1 Firm characteristics and access to credit/finance 
2.1.1  Firm’s age  
Some aspects related to the firm’s age, such as reputation and the size of tangible assets, can 
reduce or mitigate the problem of information asymmetry (Berger and Udell, 1998; Pandula, 
2011; Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2012; Abdulsaleh and Worthington 2013) and thus can reduce 
the cost of financing (pecking order theory). Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2012) study Portuguese  
firm-level panel data and  find that a firm’s age “is relevant for: the impact of financial deficit 
on variations of short- and long-term debt; the level of adjustment of short- and long-term 
debt toward the respective optimal levels; and the relationships between usual determinants 
and short- and long-term debt.”  
 
2.1.2 Firm size 
Large firms tend to be better positioned, relative to small firms, to access finance, especially 
external finance. An important reason for this easier access is the documented positive link 
between size and productivity and growth. For example, using data from eight European 
countries, Pagano and Schivard (2003) find that larger firm size has a positive impact on 
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productivity growth through allowing firms to benefit from R&D-induced higher returns. A 
number of empirical studies have used firm size, typically represented by total assets, and 
found that size matters for access to external finance. For example, using data from U.K. 
manufacturing firms over the period from 1989-1999, Bougheas et al. (2006) find that size 
(along with firm’s age and profitability) is a major determinant of access to short-term and 
long-term credit.  
Kumar and Francisco (2005) use data from Brazil and find that firm’s size is a major 
determinant of access to credit and credit constraints. The authors find that “[l]arge and 
medium firms are more likely to have a loan, and less likely to have credit constraints…size 
appeared to have a much more significant effect on determining access to credit than 
performance-related variables… there is an effective quantitative limit in the allocation of 
credit to smaller sized borrowers” (Kumar and Francisco, 2005, p.20). Similarly, the impact 
of firm’s size on access to finance has been documented in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), 
Kashyap et al. (1996), and Atanasova and Wilson (2004) and the findings generally show that 
the firm’s access to non-bank debt and long-term debt has a positive correlation with firm’s 
size. The role of size in easing credit/finance constraints has also been identified in the case of 
16 African countries studied by Kounouwewa and Chao (2011). Using survey data covering 
1559 firms, the authors report that size and foreign ownership are important determinants of 
financial obstacles facing firms.7 
 
2.1.3   Industry sector 
Some theoretical studies postulate that industry classification can represent (proxy for) 
business risk (Hall et al., 2000; Barbosa and Moraes, 2003) and thus influence the firm’s 
access to debt financing. Firms operating in whole sale and retail industries were found to 
have weakest asset and debt ratio structures while firms in the agricultural industry were 
found to have strongest asset and capital structures (Abor, 2007). However, a study using a 
large sample of firm data from Spain (González et al., 2007) finds that the industry sector 
(manufacturing versus service firms) did not have any impact on firms’ access to external 
finance.   
On the other hand, Kuntchev et al. (2012) found regional differences in the impact of industry 
type on financial constraints. Using firm-level data from Enterprise Surveys, the authors 
report that in Eastern Europe & Central Asia and Latin America & Caribbean countries “the 
distributions of the credit constrained status within the 3 sectors (manufacturing, retail and 
other services) are very similar”; in East-Asia and Pacific “manufacturing firms are more 
likely to be credit constrained” and in South Asia, the strongest credit constraints were faced 
by the retail sector, While in Africa, firms in the ‘other services’ sector faced the least credit 
constraints. 
 
2.2 Effects of owner/manager attributes 
2.2.1  Owner/manager’s age 
Using a sample of 87 manufacturing SMEs from Asmara City in Eritrea, Ogubazghi and 
Muturi (2014) find that while both the age and education of managers/owners have positive 
                                                 
7 It is worth noting that causality may also run from financial constraints to firm size. For theoretical models explaining this 
relationship, see  for example, Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Cabral and Mata (2003) . Also, see Angelini and Generale (2005) 
for empirical evidence based on Italian firm-level data. 
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effects on access to bank loans, only the effect of age is significant. Age can influence the 
owner/manager’s (especially in the case of SMEs) decision to use or not use bank loans 
(demand side effects of age) either as a result of age-related attitude towards risk or as a result 
of age-related differences in the motivation to become entrepreneur/business owner which 
varies (Nakano and Nguyen 2011; Abdulsaleh and Worthington 2013), or both.  
It worth noting that age is also a major factor on the supply side of finance, since banks view 
younger and older firm owners/managers differently. While young owners/managers can be 
perceived as risky, old ones can be viewed as non-dynamic and non-innovative.   
 
2.2.2  Owner/manager’s education 
A number of studies have argued that banks consider more educated firm owners or managers 
as more creditworthy (Abdulsaleh and Worthington 2013; Ogubazghi and Muturi, 2014). The 
level of education of the firm’s owner/manager can have a significant effect in improving 
access to finance although some studies found that the effect of educational levels was not 
significant (see, for example, Ogubazghi and Muturi, 2014). The assumption (especially in the 
case of SMEs) underlying the positive effect of owner/manager’s educational level on access 
to finance is that educational level is positively correlated with firm performance (Kasseeah 
and Thoplan, 2012). Tertiary education, in particular, has been shown to have a significant 
influence on easing access to bank capital (Bates, 1990). However, some studies have noted a 
negative relationship between owner/manager’s educational level and/or skills and access to 
access to credit; for example, Le et al. (2006) in the case of Vietnamese firms.  
 
2.2.3  Gender and access to finance 
Numerous studies have documented the significant differences between female- and male-
owned/managed firms in access to external financing (Carter and Rosa, 1998; Haines et al., 
1999; Coleman, 2000 and 2007; Brush et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2001). These differences 
tend to be due not only to historical (male-owned firms are traditionally older) and cultural 
factors (Gupta et al., 2009 and 2013; Shinnar et al., 2012) but also to differences in access to 
education, networks, high-profit and high-growth industries and age demographics. Thus, the 
factors reviewed earlier seem to have an amplified influence on female-owned (or managed) 
firms. Since women, especially in developing countries, tend to be less educate and less 
finance literate (Baydas et al, 1995; Tsai, 2004; Marlow and Patton, 2005), they face greater 
constraints in accessing formal finance.8 This is in particular the case in sub-Saharan Africa 
and some of the MENA countries—the regional focus of this paper—where there is empirical 
evidence of lower start-up capital for women-owned businesses. For example, Brixiová and 
Kangoye (2016), using data from a survey of entrepreneurs in Swaziland, find that “Women 
entrepreneurs have smaller start-up capital and are less likely to fund it from the formal sector 
than their men counterparts, pointing to a possible room for policy interventions.” On the 
other hand, using SME data from Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys, 
Yaldiz et al. (2011) document “a positive but statistically insignificant association between 
female ownership and trade credit use.” 
                                                 
8
 However, Yaldiz et al. (2011), showed that women have more ability to access formal credit and maintain 
business women can be viewed as better educated and  more talented compared to business men because to be 
able to establish a business in a field that has been traditionally dominated by men women have to have greater 
levels of education and talent. 
 
Baliamoune & Lutz: Financing & performance of female-owned firms in ME & Africa   6 
 
Based on data from a large sample of borrowing men and women business owners in Canada, 
Fabowale et al. (1995) find that “men and women business owners differ in systematic ways, 
but that when such differences are taken into account, no differences in the terms of credit 
persist.” Furthermore, the authors find that female small business owners “feel themselves to 
have been treated disrespectfully by lending officers to a significantly greater extent than do 
male business owners”. The findings in the study by Coleman and Carsky (1996) are 
consistent with these results, since the authors report that a high proportion of US women 
business owners surveyed have switched banks and that the major reasons included: “poor 
customer service, an arrogant and condescending attitude on the part of bank personnel, and 
errors and mistakes.” The authors recommend that that bank managers should improve the 
quality of their interactions with women business owners. A male-female funding gap has 
also been documented by Alsos et al. (2006) who find that “[w]hile there are few detected 
gender differences with respect to funding perceptions and behavior, women obtain 
significantly less financial capital to develop their new businesses. The authors also find that 
this lower level of financial capital that women obtain is correlated with lower early business 
growth relative to their male counterparts. Saparito et al. (2013) use 696 matched firm 
owner/manager–bank manager pairs and show that “male–male pairs of business 
owner/managers and bankers had the highest levels of trust, satisfaction with credit access, 
and bank knowledge, while female–female pairs had the lowest levels for each measure; with 
mixed pairs in the middle on all accounts”. This is consistent with the perception of 
discrimination and disrespect reported by women firm owners/managers (Fabowale et al., 
2995; Coleman and Carsky, 1996). 
However, Orser et al. (2006) examine gender differences among Canadian SME owners 
seeking external finance, including commercial debt, leasing, supplier financing, and equity 
capital find (after controlling for size and industry sector) that “women business owners were 
equally likely as men to seek all types of external financing, except for external equity 
capital.” The authors also find that, even after controlling for systemic factors, women 
majority-owned businesses were significantly less likely to seek equity capital but men and 
women business owners were equally likely to obtain capital when they do apply.  
Empirical evidence also shows that women-owned firms tend to export less compared with 
male-owned firms, even in developed countries. For example, Orser et al. (2010) survey a 
large number of Canadian SMEs and report that after controlling for sector, firm, and owner 
characteristics, women majority-owned firms were significantly less likely to export than 
male-owned firms.  To the extent that exporting firms have greater access to, and seek more, 
external finance, this suggests an additional mechanism for women’s lower access to external 
finance. 
 
3. The Data 
 
3.1 The data set 
The data set used in this study presents cross-sectional financial reporting data of companies in 
the Middle East and Africa. It contains ownership, balance sheet and profit/loss information. 
Data source: Bureau van Dijk (BvD); Orbis global firm database; 278,024 firms from Africa 
and the Middle East; yearly data for 2006-2015; 25,523 firms (9%) with global owner name; 
unbalanced panel with average panel depth of 5 years. See Table 1 in the appendix for a 
summary of the data source and search details. 
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Available firm-level data include balance sheet data, profit and loss statement data, trade 
descriptions, industry and peer group information, ownership information, stock price and 
firm valuation data. Available ownership information includes name and nationality of global 
ultimate owner, index variables for female/male/family/state/international ownership, number 
of owners, BvD independence index (15 different ratings based on ownership concentration 
and type), percentage of direct and total ownership, and consolidation status of firm. 
Further information about the data set is given in the appendix. Table 2 presents a list of 
variables and their definitions; Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the variables used. 
Note that the number of firms and observations is mainly constrained by the available 
financial data ie revenues, profits etc. Consequently, data estimations contain up to 18,700 
observations covering up to 3,600 firms. 
 
3.2 Data characteristics 
The share of female-owned firms in the Middle East and Africa is approximately about four 
percent on average. This share varies widely across countries but much less across industries. 
As Table 3.2 shows, female-ownership shares by country in our data set range from 13 percent 
in DRC to zero percent in countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Sudan, Uganda, 
Yemen, Zimbabwe. According to the data shown in Table 3.3, female-ownership shares by 
industry range from about six percent in construction, wholesale and retail trade to about two 
percent in agriculture, manufacturing, and media services. 
Female-owned firms have on average lower sales, profits and returns on equity. Female-owned 
firms also have lower levels of equity and debt capital and a lower leverage (gearing); i.e., ratios 
of debt to equity. Table 3.4 shows that female-owned firms on average have access to less than 
half of the amount of equity capital compared with other firms and access less than 20 percent 
of the amount of debt financing relative to other firms. Similarly, female-owned firms on 
average generate half the sales and less than 20 percent of the profits of other firms. 
 
4. Modeling and results 
 
4.1  Econometric modeling 
Given the panel data available, we can use the following generalized regression model to 
investigate the economic hypotheses presented: 
(1) 
, , ,i t i i t t i t iy F G Mα ε η= + Β + Γ + ∆ + +  
where the dependent variable tiy ,  is a profit or sales level indicator (sales, profit, return) of 
company i in period t; iF  is a vector of determinants specific to firm i but invariant over time 
(such as country or industry); tiG ,  is a vector of determinants that may vary between firms 
and also over time (e.g., gearing); tM  is a vector of period-specific determinants outside of a 
particular firm (captured by year); ti ,ε is an idiosyncratic error term that may vary between 
firms and also over time and is independently distributed with E( ti ,ε ) = 0; and iη  represents 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms, i.e., a company specific fixed effect or random effect 
(that is independently distributed). 
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This general specification allows for pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), random-effects (RE), 
and fixed-effects (FE) modeling, where the random or fixed effects are firm-specific 
components. The more general approach is to allow for random firm-specific effects; the case 
where these effects are fixed, that is determinate constants instead of random variables, is a 
special sub-case. All model variants reported below were estimated with OLS pooled models, 
FE and RE panel models, and instrumental variable (IV) models. Models were also run with 
controls for years, countries and industries (where appropriate). 
The data available contain several firm-specific, time-invariant variables that can be assumed to 
capture a significant part of present fixed effects (e.g., country, industry indicators). Hence a 
random-effects specification seems to be a priori more appropriate. However, Hausman tests for 
FE versus RE modeling undertaken for the models reported below (not reported here) tend to 
reject the null of consistency in the RE modeling; consequently the reported FE model should 
be considered more reliable and we also use an instrumental-variable (IV) specification. 
Nevertheless, all estimations together present a consistent picture and allow for unified 
conclusions regarding the role of female-owned firms in Africa and the Middle East. Estimation 
results are summarized below. 
 
4.2 Results 
Our results are derived from pooled OLS, FE, RE, and RE-IV estimations. In the latter RE-IV 
estimations we take account of the possibly endogenous nature of female ownership (i.e., that 
low-performance firms are not normally selected by men and hence may end up being owned 
by women) by instrumenting female ownership with a number of variables representing 
intrinsic ownership characteristics. We also take account of differences in the level of risk 
involved by the chosen businesses. 
In a first step, we take a preliminary look at the effect of female-ownership on revenue and 
profits. Following Lutz (2013), we construct 3-year averages of main right-hand-side (RHS) 
variables, here previous capital endowments, and use their lagged values as main determinants 
together with a female-ownership indicator. As Table 4.1 shows, such a simple OLS model 
explains 50 to 70 percent of variations in revenues and profits (measured in natural logs) and 
female ownership appears to have a statistically significant negative effect. 
An important question arises: Are women less capable entrepreneurs? When we extent the 
analysis to account for efficiency of use of capital, a different picture emerges. In the 
augmented models presented in Table 4.2 we use lagged interaction terms between female 
ownership and the 3-year averages of equity endowments and the gearing (debt/equity) ratios. 
While female ownership per se still is correlated with lower revenues, profits, and returns, both 
interaction terms are positive and statistically significant. Apparently, increased availability of 
equity and/or debt capital as well as higher leverage have significantly positive effects on firm 
performance. When female-owned firms acquire more equity or debt financing or when they 
increase their leverage, resulting performance increases are significantly greater than for other 
firms as indicated by the interaction terms. These preliminary results are confirmed by random-
effects (Table 4.3) and fixed-effects (Table 4.4) estimations.9 
However, female ownership may be endogenous. Additionally, female entrepreneurs may 
choose systematically less risky businesses. To address these issues, we instrument female 
ownership using a risk measure and intrinsic ownership characteristics (ownership 
concentration, degree of independence) while controlling for other relevant factors (country, 
                                                 
9
 Note that Hausman tests reject the null of consistency in the RE modelling; consequently the reported FE model should be 
considered more reliable or an instrumental-variable (IV) specification should be used. 
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industry, year, data availability, consolidation status). As a risk measure we use the 3-year 
standard deviation of profits, which has been shown to be a significant determinant of average 
future firm performance. As expected, risk has a negative and significant effect on the 
probability of the firm owner being female; see Table 4.5. 
Descriptive statistics presented earlier suggest that female entrepreneurs might be capital 
constraint since (on average) they have less equity and debt available to operate their firms. 
Estimating models with determinants of equity and debt, respectively, shown in Table 4.5, 
confirms this: female ownership has a negative and significant effect on levels of equity and 
debt. 
Finally, Table 4.6 presents RE-IV estimations of the effect of female-ownership on revenue and 
profits where female ownership is instrumented and variations of individual business risk are 
taken into account. Obtained results are qualitatively identical to our earlier OLS results: while 
female ownership per remains correlated with lower revenues, profits, and returns, both 
interaction terms are positive and statistically significant. 
 
5. A theoretical explanation 
 
In what follows, we develop a possible theoretical explanation for the main results presented 
above. We start with the observation that there is a positive relationship between the riskiness of 
businesses undertaken and their average return on equity capital employed. The main reason 
being that capital investors (firm owners) will only accept higher risk if they can expect higher 
returns on their investment in turn.10 
Similar to the conventions in the capital-asset pricing theory, the required average return for 
any business investment i, ri, can be expressed as: 
(2) 1i f i Ci
i
r r
V
α σ
 
= +  
 
 
where rf denotes the risk-free rate of interest, αi is a risk-parameter derived from the capital-
asset pricing model, σCi is the standard deviation of profits (or cash flow), and Vi is firm i’s 
market value of equity. Note that µi = rf + αi (σCi/ Vi) and σi = (σCi/ Vi) denote the expected 
value and the standard deviation of the rate of return on equity, respectively. 
A risk-averse investor will now take the probability of default given the investment’s risk and 
her capitalization into account. Within a single period, the business will default if the total 
loss from the business exceeds available capital ie: 
(3) i i i i i irV V L r L− ≥ ⇔ ≤ −  
where Li is firm i’s leverage ie the ratio of debt to equity financing. 
Under conventional assumptions about the distribution of profits, the probability of default 
(satisfying equation (3)) is then decreasing when equity capital and/or leverage are increased. 
This probability P(.) can be expressed by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of firm 
i’s return Fi(.). 
(4) ( ) ( )i i i iP r L F L≤ − = −  
                                                 
10
 Lutz (2013), Lutz (2012). 
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If we assume return to be normally distributed the CDF becomes: 
(5) ( )
/
i i
i i
ci i
LF L
V
µ
σ
 
− −
− = Φ  
 
 
where Φ(.) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. 
Holding Fi(-Li) constant, eg at 5%, amounts to requiring that the risk of default will not rise 
above 5%. Investors requiring such a default risk limit would have to seek less risky business 
investments if either their equity capital Vi or their leverage Li is lowered as equation (5) 
clearly shows. Choosing alternative business investments with lower profit risk σCi will then 
lead to lower expected returns according to equation (2). 
Hence capital-constrained entrepreneurs – those with less access to equity and debt capital 
and lower leverage rates - choose less risky businesses even if their willingness to accept risks 
is the same as everybody else’s. As a result their businesses are less profitable even though 
they may utilize available capital more efficiently. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this study, we present evidence that there is a clear gender-specific pattern revealed by the 
data that appears to be supported by the econometric investigation. For all firms including 
female-owned firms, increased availability of equity and/or debt capital as well as higher 
leverage have significant positive effects on firm performance, measured by sales, profits and 
returns on equity. Female-owned firms have on average lower sales, profits and returns on 
equity. And female ownership per se appears to significantly lower firm performance according 
to all measures used even when we control for the levels of available capital and the degrees of 
leverage. 
However, when the interplay of ownership with capital availability is taken into account, the 
nature of the impact of women’s ownership seems to change. When female-owned firms 
acquire more equity or debt financing or when they increase their leverage, resulting 
performance improvement is significantly greater than for other firms. This suggests that 
female-owned firms would perform better than other firms given the same access to capital. 
Existing financing constraints appear as a major factor in holding female-owned firm 
performance back in the Middle East and Africa. 
Our results are confirmed by anecdotal evidence. For example, when the EBRD launched the 
Women in Business programme in Egypt in October 2015 hosted by the National Bank of 
Egypt, present women entrepreneurs uniformly mentioned lack of capital access as a major 
concern. Coincidentally, all five Bank representatives present at the conference were male.11 
Finally, we present a possible theoretical explanation for the results obtained. Female 
entrepreneurs choose less risky businesses because they are capital-constrained. As a result their 
businesses are smaller and less profitable even though they may utilize available capital more 
efficiently. 
 
The results obtained in this paper have important policy implications. First, policymakers 
should ensure that financial institutions (especially banks)’s decision makers personnel are not 
                                                 
11
 EBRD (2015);  Lutz attended the conference. 
Baliamoune & Lutz: Financing & performance of female-owned firms in ME & Africa   11 
 
biased against women owners/managers. Specific training as well as greater gender diversity at 
these institutions may help to achieve this outcome. Second, while policymakers (as a result of 
recommendations by the World Bank and the African Development Bank through the African 
Women in Business Initiative) in some African and MENA countries have tried to address the 
supply-side constraint, there are important demand-side constraints that need to be alleviated. 
Women’s lower use of external finance could also be due to lower demand for it. This lower 
demand may stem from the fact that women manage the firm while at the same time taking care 
of children so that firm growth is not a priority. In this case, investing early childhood education 
and preschool day care could significantly improve women’s demand for, and access to, credit 
and external finance as it would free up women’s time and allow them to participate more in 
training and support networks which should contribute to higher productivity and better 
performance (World Bank, 2011; Blackden and Hallward-Driemeier, 2013).  
Finally, education can play an important role in changing the way society views female-owned 
businesses. For example, in most business schools (including in developed countries) educators 
discuss business strategies and achievements undertaken mostly (if not exclusively) by male 
business leaders (role models). This needs to be changed, as there are now many examples of 
successful female-led firms in both developed and developing countries that could serve as 
insightful case studies in business schools.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Data source 
 
# Data type Source Downloaded / data Date 
1 African firm data 
(balance sheet, 
profit/loss) 
Bureau van Dijk 
(BvD), Orbis 
database 
German University in Cairo, 
online license 
3 December 
2015 
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Table 2. List of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
BvD Firm identifier (derived from BvD ID) 
Year Year 
Country Country 
Industry NACE 2 Core Category (1 digit) 
BvDIndepIndic BvD Independence Indicator 
BvDIndepA BvDIndepIndic = A-, A, or A+ 
ConsCode Consolidation Code 
NoShareholders Number of Recorded Shareholders 
NoSubsidiaries Number of Recorded Subsidiaries 
GUOName Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) Name 
GUODirectPct GUO direct ownership share (%) 
GUOType GUO type 
GUOCorp GUO = Corporation 
GUOFamily GUO = Family-owned 
GUOGovt GUO = Government-owned 
GUOGender GUO Gender 
GUOFemale GUOGender = Female 
LastAvailYear Last Available Year 
NoEmployees Number of Employees 
Revenue Operating revenue (000´s USD) 
PLbeforTax Profit/Loss before Tax (000´s USD) 
NetIncome Net Income (000´s USD) 
Equity Shareholder Funds (000´s USD) 
TotalAssets Total Assets (000´s USD) 
Debt Debt (000´s USD): TotalAssets - Equity 
ROE Return on Equity (%), use net Income 
Gearing Gearing (%), Debt / Equity 
 
 
ln* Natural log ln(*) of variable <*> 
a3* 3-period average a3(*) of variable <*> 
s3* 3-period standard deviation s3(*) of variable <*> 
FemaleGear Interaction term: GUOFemale*Gearing 
FemaleShdf Interaction term: GUOFemale*ln(Equity) 
FemaleDebt Interaction term: GUOFemale*ln(Debt) 
FemaleA3Gear Interaction term: GUOFemale*a3(Gearing) 
FemaleA3Shdf Interaction term: GUOFemale*a3(ln(Equity)) 
FemaleA3Debt Interaction term: GUOFemale* a3(ln(Debt)) 
lns3PLbeforTax Income risk measure: ln(s3(PLbeforTax) 
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics (selected variables) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 229707   2006 2014 
Country 229707    69 
Industry 203310 4.334351 1.881647 0 9 
BvDIndepA 229707 .0411785 .1987034 0 1 
NoShareholders 229707 2.285586 4.465129 0 122 
NoSubsidiaries 229707 2.481291 12.34119 0 591 
GUOCorp 229707 .4133918 .492443 0 1 
GUOFamily 229707 .0116366 .1072437 0 1 
GUOGovt 229707 .0183364 .134165 0 1 
GUOFemale 229707 .0372997 .1894956 0 1 
GUODirectPct 171612 91.41803 20.15072 0 100 
GUOTotalPct 136242 99.71207 3.286725 50.03 100 
LastAvailYear 229707 2012.817 1.249588 2011 2015 
NoEmployees 21426 1065.801 4914.384 0 143828 
Revenue 64200 303875.8 3312367 -4900817 3.50e+08 
PLbeforTax 31909 43011.33 277739.6 -7871623 1.28e+07 
NetIncome 16582 60387.22 356773.3 -7976315 2.64e+07 
Equity 16839 481864.9 1848227 -3195687 5.64e+07 
TotalAssets 16854 3378596 8.77e+07 -10.61146 1.12e+10 
ROE 8982 15.325 44.90861 -995.397 966.607 
Gearing 6748 109.5777 149.672 0 996.425 
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Table 3.2. Share of female-owned firms by country (1) 
Country ISO Code Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
United Arab Emirates AE 13086 .0350757 .1839781 
Angola AO 117 0 0 
Burkina Faso BF 108 .0833333 .2776739 
Bahrain BH 1566 .0344828 .1825239 
Burundi BI 9 0 0 
Benin BJ 99 0 0 
Botswana BW 396 .0227273 .1492212 
Democratic Republic of Congo CD 135 .1333333 .3412007 
Central African Republic CF 27 0 0 
Congo CG 162 0 0 
Cote D'Ivoire CI 477 .0566038 .2313265 
Cameroon CM 684 .0263158 .1601898 
Cape Verde CV 36 0 0 
Djibouti DJ 18 0 0 
Algeria DZ 756 .0357143 .1856997 
Egypt EG 13014 .0359613 .1862008 
Ethiopia ET 54 0 0 
Gabon GA 135 0 0 
Ghana GH 423 .0212766 .1444758 
Gambia GM 54 0 0 
Guinea GN 36 0 0 
Guinea Bissau GW 27 0 0 
Israel IL 82404 .0360419 .1863957 
Iraq IQ 1125 .008 .0891238 
Iran IR 684 .0263158 .1601898 
Jordan JO 3546 .0380711 .1913949 
Kenya KE 837 .0215054 .1451484 
Comoros KM 9 0 0 
Kuwait KW 4068 .0995575 .2994459 
Lebanon LB 5256 .0479452 .2136707 
Liberia LR 36 0 0 
Lesotho LS 54 0 0 
Libya LY 36 0 0 
Morocco MA 11556 .038162 .1915955 
Madagascar MG 81 0 0 
Mali ML 108 0 0 
Mauritania MR 45 0 0 
Malta MT 41841 .0189288 .1362753 
Mauritius MU 1485 .0545455 .2271673 
Malawi MW 198 0 0 
Mozambique MZ 153 0 0 
Namibia NA 387 0 0 
Niger NE 18 0 0 
Nigeria NG 1314 .0136986 .116281 
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Table 3.2. Share of female-owned firms by country (2) 
Country ISO Code Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
Oman OM 1620 .0111111 .1048544 
Palestine PS 468 .0384615 .1925135 
Qatar QA 1755 .0461538 .209878 
Rwanda RW 81 0 0 
Saudi Arabia SA 25020 .0838129 .2771126 
Sudan SD 180 0 0 
Sierra Leone SL 36 0 0 
Senegal SN 918 .0098039 .0985819 
South Sudan SS 18 0 0 
Sao Tome and Principe ST 9 0 0 
Syria SY 279 .0322581 .1770022 
Swaziland SZ 72 0 0 
Chad TD 36 0 0 
Togo TG 99 0 0 
Tunisia TN 612 .0294118 .1690959 
Tanzania TZ 423 .0212766 .1444758 
Uganda UG 189 0 0 
Yemen YE 351 0 0 
South Africa ZA 9702 .0046382 .0679498 
Zambia ZM 522 .0517241 .221682 
Zimbabwe ZW 621 0 0 
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Table 3.3. Share of female-owned firms by industry 
NACE 2 NACE 2 Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
0 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, 
Mining, Quarrying 
3771 .0190931 .1368704 
1 Manufacture, food products, 
beverages, etc 
11349 .036479 .187487 
2 Manufacture, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, etc 
22491 .0232093 .150571 
3 Manufacture, transport 
equipment, machinery, 
furniture, etc 
5373 .0217755 .1459635 
4 Construction, wholesale, retail 
trade 
92169 .0584904 .2346697 
5 Transport 8721 .0206398 .1421835 
6 Media, broadcasting 34416 .0180439 .1331122 
7 Services, management, 
consulting 
14787 .0316494 .1750709 
8 Services, other 5616 .0352564 .1844436 
9 Services arts, entertainment 4617 .0389864 .1935834 
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Table 3.4. Key financial indicators: Female vs other firms 
Indicator  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min  max 
 
      
Equity All firms 16839 481864.9 1848227 -3195687 5.64e+07 
 
Female-
owned 
203 143995.8 1238093 -10647.65 1.76e+07 
 
      
Debt All firms 16757 2651590 8.70e+07 .0500461 1.12e+10 
 
Female-
owned 
200 342703.2 2072611 25.1991 2.76e+07 
 
      
Gearing All firms 6748 109.5777 149.672 0 996.425 
 
Female-
owned 
56 83.4762 116.2051 0 734.751 
 
      
Revenue All firms 64200 303875.8 3312367 -4900817 3.50e+08 
 
Female-
owned 
1699 161322.2 3098537 -9254.373 1.20e+08 
 
      
PLbeforTax All firms 31909 43011.33 277739.6 -7871623 1.28e+07 
 
Female-
owned 
453 7616.461 22113.76 -24081.69 172495 
 
      
NetIncome All firms 16582 60387.22 356773.3 -7976315 2.64e+07 
 
Female-
owned 
207 5983.08 16205.15 -24018.31 72091 
 
      
ROE All firms 8982 15.325 44.90861 -995.397 966.607 
 
Female-
owned 
80 14.26438 21.51995 -103.808 77.534 
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Table 4.1. Preliminary results: Revenues and profits (Pooled OLS estimations) 
Model (4.1.1) OLS (4.1.2) OLS (4.1.3) OLS 
Dep. Variable lnRevenue lnPLbeforTax lnNetIncome 
 
   
l.a3lnEquity 0.660*** 0.726*** 0.803*** 
l.a3Gearing 0.000000038*** 0.000000038*** 0.00000041*** 
 
   
GUOFemale -0.191* -0.487*** -0.495*** 
 
   
 
   
 
   
Observations 18709 15186 7772 
R-sq.  0.5167 0.6598 0.7377 
R-sq. adj. 0.5167 0.6598 0.7376 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i)  All models estimated with pooled OLS. 
(ii) All models include a constant. All models include country, industry, and year dummies. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 14% level. 
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Table 4.2. Results summary: Revenues, profits, and returns (Pooled OLS estimations) 
Model (4.2.1) OLS (4.2.2) OLS (4.2.3) OLS (4.2.4) OLS 
Dep. Variable lnRevenue lnPLbeforTax lnNetIncome ROE 
 
    
l.a3lnEquity 0.653*** 0.707*** 0.749*** -3.548*** 
l.a3Gearing 0.000000037*** 0.000000035*** 0.0000016*** 0.00012*** 
 
    
GUOFemale -1.252** -2.228*** -1.842*** -104.1* 
 
    
l.FemaleA3Shfd 0.083* 0.179*** 0.151** 8.318* 
l.FemaleA3Gear 0.00012*** 0.00013*** 0.00014*** 0.0042 
 
    
BvDIndepA -0.372*** -0.285*** -0.261*** -6.718*** 
NoShareholders 0.036*** 0.045*** 0.029*** 0.496*** 
NoShareholders^2 -0.00025*** -0.00034*** -0.00023*** -0.0037*** 
 
    
 
    
Observations 17654 14356 7534 6597 
R-sq.  0.5826 0.6887 0.7689 0.0884 
R-sq. adj. 0.5805 0.6868 0.7662 0.0790 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i)  All models estimated with pooled OLS. 
(ii) All models include a constant. All models include country, industry, and year dummies. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.3. Results summary: Revenues, profits, and returns (RE estimations) 
Model (4.3.1) RE (4.3.2) RE (4.3.3) RE (4.3.4) RE 
Dep. Variable lnRevenue lnPLbeforTax lnNetIncome ROE 
 
    
l.a3lnEquity 0.424*** 0.584*** 0.654*** -5.595*** 
l.a3Gearing 0.000000022*** 0.000000021*** 0.00000051*** 0.000065 
 
    
GUOFemale -1.325*** -1.855** -2.215** -95.39 
 
    
l.FemaleA3Shfd 0.066 0.134* 0.188* 5.550 
l.FemaleA3Gear 0.00016*** 0.00010** 0.00014*** 0.040** 
 
    
BvDIndepA -0.423*** -0.286*** -0.252*** -8.211*** 
NoShareholders 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.482** 
NoShareholders^2 -0.00037*** -0.00040*** -0.00032*** -0.0030 
 
    
 
    
Observations 17654 10595 7534 6597 
Groups (Firms) 3355 2981 2550 1083 
R-sq. within 0.0360 0.0264 0.0054 0.0128 
R-sq. between 0.5748 0.7189 0.7415 0.1809 
R-sq. overall 0.5493 0.7064 0.7565 0.0833 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i)  All models estimated with random effects. 
(ii) All models include a constant. All models include country, industry, and year dummies. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 13% level. 
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Table 4.4. Results summary: Revenues, profits, and returns (RE estimations) 
Model (4.4.1) FE (4.4.2) FE (4.4.3) FE (4.4.4) FE 
Dep. Variable lnRevenue lnPLbeforTax lnNetIncome ROE 
 
    
l.a3lnEquity 0.194*** 0.153*** 0.041 -8.290*** 
l.a3Gearing -0.0000000010 -0.000000012 0.0000000012 -0.00011* 
 
    
l. lns3PLbeforTax 0.089*** 0.113*** 0.050** 3.732*** 
 
    
l.FemaleA3Shfd -0.104 -0.224 -0.144 -3.968 
l.FemaleA3Gear 0.00020*** 0.00015** 0.000087 0.092*** 
 
    
 
    
Observations 18558 15170 7769 6606 
Groups (Firms) 3628 3413 2725 1085 
R-sq. within 0.0448 0.0205 0.0131 0.0180 
R-sq. between 0.3619 0.5052 0.6039 0.1080 
R-sq. overall 0.3960 0.5233 0.6181 0.0443 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i)  All models estimated with fixed effects. 
(ii) All models include a constant. All models include year dummies. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.5. Results summary: Female Ownership, Financing (IV estimations) 
Model (4.5.1) OLS (4.5.2) RE-IV (4.5.3) RE-IV 
Dep. Variable GUOFemale lnEquity lnDebt 
 
   
l.lns3PLbeforTax -0.0031***   
 
   
l.a3lnEquity  0.922*** 0.571*** 
l.a3Gearing  -0.00000057* 0.0000066*** 
 
   
GUOFemale  -2.666*** -21.64*** 
 
   
BvDIndepA 0.00059   
NoShareholders 0.000020   
GUODirectPct -0.00016***   
 
   
 
   
Observations 15338 6414 6506 
Groups (Firms)  1893 1914 
R-sq. within  0.0888 0.0792 
R-sq. between  0.9264 0.2396 
R-sq. (overall) 0.0348 0.9251 0.2784 
R-sq. adj. 0.0302   
Prob > chi2 (>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes.  
(i)  Model (1) estimated with pooled OLS; Models (2), (3) estimated with random effects IV 
regression; GUOGender instrumented by BvDIndepA, NoShareholders, GUODirectPct, 
lns3PLbeforTax, I.Conscode, I.LastAvailYear, I.Country, I.Industry, I.Year.  
(ii) All equations include a constant; all equations include year dummies; equation (1) includes 
dummies for country, industry, ConsCode, and LastAvailYear. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 19% level. 
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Table 4.6. Results summary: Revenues, profits, and returns (IV estimations) 
Model (4.6.1) RE-IV (4.6.2) RE-IV (4.6.3) RE-IV 
Dep. Variable lnRevenue lnPLbeforTax lnNetIncome 
 
   
l.a3lnEquity 0.493*** 0.624*** 0.738*** 
l.a3Gearing 0.0000021*** 0.0000026*** 0.0000057*** 
 
   
GUOFemale -37.27*** -89.51*** -63.60*** 
 
   
l.FemaleA3Shfd 3.524*** 8.314*** 5.886*** 
l.FemaleA3Gear 0.0069*** 0.0071*** 0.044*** 
 
   
 
   
Observations 10652 8616 5289 
Groups (Firms) 2218 2082 1739 
R-sq. within 0.0347 0.0043 0.0038 
R-sq. between 0.4015 0.3815 0.5373 
R-sq. overall 0.3740 0.3536 0.5709 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes.  
(i)  All models estimated with random effects IV regression; GUOGender instrumented by 
BvDIndepA, NoShareholders, GUODirectPct, lns3PLbeforTax, I.Conscode, I.LastAvailYear, 
I.Country, I.Industry, I.Year.  
(ii) All equations include a constant; all equations include year dummies. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
